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| Enterprise Risk Analysis for Property and Liability Insurance Companies | Printer version
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by Donald F. Mango
Enterprise Risk Analysis for Property & Liability
Insurance Companies, a newly published book from leading
global risk and reinsurance specialist Guy Carpenter, provides
a comprehensive and practical guide to enterprise risk
management (ERM) for insurance executives, risk managers,
actuaries, academics and others. It covers both traditional ERM
topics like loss distribution modeling and loss reserve models,
as well as emerging solutions such as timeline simulation
and linking risk management and capital optimization. The
following article is adapted from Enterprise Risk Analysis for
Property & Liability Insurance Companies.
Corporate Decision Making Using
an Enterprise Risk Model
Evolution of corporate decision making under uncertainty
Simulation modeling is widely used in all forms of
corporate and organizational decision making under
uncertainty. A science has developed around this topic
and is known as decision analysis, which involves the
three-step evolutionary process illustrated in exhibit 1.
1. Deterministic Project Analysis: Using a single
deterministic forecast for project cash flows, an objective
function such as present value or internal rate of
return is produced. Sensitivities to critical variables
may be shown. Uncertainty (along with other
intangibles) is handled judgmentally (i.e., intuitively)
by decision makers.
2. Risk Analysis: Forecasts of distributions of critical
variables are fed into a Monte Carlo simulation engine
to produce a distribution of present value of cash flows.
Risk judgment is still applied intuitively.
3. Certainty Equivalent: Certainty equivalent is an
extension of risk analysis that quantifies the intuitive
risk judgment by means of a corporate risk preference
or utility function. The utility function does not replace
judgment but simply formalizes the judgment so it can
be consistently applied.
Best practice in actuarial risk modeling has evolved
to step 2, the risk analysis stage. Indeed, that is what
actuaries call DFA. There is not yet consensus that the
next evolutionary leap from step 2 to step 3 is proper
or even meaningful. The debate centers on the role of
corporate risk preference in an efficient market/modern
portfolio theory world. An attempt to summarize the
debate might go as follows:
- Diversified investors, with many small holdings of all
available securities (the market portfolio) are concerned
only with nondiversifiable (i.e., systematic) risk.
- Diversifiable (i.e., firm specific) risk does not command
any risk premium (additional return above the risk-free
rate) in the market, since it can be diversified away by
simply holding the market portfolio.
- Investors require a risk premium as compensation for
bearing systematic risk.
- Firm managers should focus on maximizing shareholder
value.
- Since their shareholders can diversify away firm-specific
risk, the shareholders are indifferent (risk neutral)
toward it.
- Therefore, firm managers ought to be indifferent to
firm-specific risk as well.

Within such a theoretical framework, there is no apparent
place for the step 3 certainty equivalent approach, with its
mathematical formulation of corporate risk preferences.
Managers should care only about the wealth, risk
preferences and other investment opportunities of the
firm’s owners. Absent a real-time survey system, the best
proxy for this information is the record of stock prices
– both their own stock and other comparable stocks. Firm
managers and equity analysts perform these (admittedly
complex) analyses in an attempt to discern the probable
impact of major firm decisions on the stock price.
While this theory is appealing and has many advocates,
it is short on practical advice for use in risk management
decision making within the firm itself. For example:
- Those managing the firm have no way to identify
which risks they face are firm specific and which are
systematic.
- One of the more common market-based risk signals
– the risk-adjusted discount rate – reflects risk only
if there is a time lag. For many kinds of risks, the
time aspect is unimportant – the risk is essentially
instantaneous.
- Market-based risk signals often lack the refinement
and discriminatory power that managers need to make
cost-benefit and tradeoff decisions for mitigation or
hedging efforts.
Neither external (market) nor internal (company) perspectives appear sufficient on their own. However,
there may be a perspective from which both approaches
are seen as complementary parts of a single whole.
Shareholders want market value maximized. Market value
consist of book value (the recorded value of held assets)
plus franchise value (the present value of future earnings
growth). Risk management aims to both facilitate future
earnings growth and prevent loss of future earnings
– that is, to protect franchise value. So it appears that
shareholders and managers may be aligned in this regard.
Both want risk management in place to protect the
franchise value. Therefore, both camps should support
an internal corporate risk policy to help the firm make its
risk management decisions in a more objective, consistent,
repeatable and transparent manner. This provides some
degree of support for the evolution to step 3.

Decision making with an internal risk model
(IRM)
Now we will discuss how corporate risk management
decision making might be done with an internal risk model
(IRM), a DFA model of the organization itself. Exhibit 2
shows the major elements in the process.
Elements 5a and 5b will be our focus here. We will begin
with corporate risk tolerance.
Element 5a: Corporate risk tolerance
We seek a mechanism that:
1. Takes an aggregate loss distribution, with many sources
of risk (e.g., lines of business);
2. Assesses (quantifies) the impact of the possible
aggregate loss outcomes on the corporation;
3. Assigns a cost to each amount of impact; and
4. Attributes the cost back to the risk sources.
Corporate risk tolerance is needed in steps 2 and 3.
The impact (effect) of a loss depends on the organization’s
size, financial resources, and ability and willingness to
tolerate volatility. We will call this combination of factors
the corporation’s risk tolerance.
Alternatively, the translation of impact into cost requires
a risk preference function of some form, either implicitly
taken from an outside source (e.g., the capital markets),
or explicitly derived from firm management attitudes.
The key point is that any selected method implies some
type of translation from impact to cost.
Some questions facing practitioners include: Should the
choice be yours or someone else’s (i.e., adopted by default)?
Should it be implicit or explicit?
If a firm would like to develop its own explicit risk
preferences, there are methods available. It’s possible to
identify the parameters of a normative corporate risk
policy using a series of experiments involving indifference.
One of the outputs of such a process is the transparent,
objective, mathematical expression of the corporation’s
acceptable risk-reward tradeoffs. Such a function can
improve cost-benefit analyses by quantifying, for example,
the minimum decrease in risk (measured by any number
of possible metrics) sufficient to justify a certain mitigation
cost. Without such a function, cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
decisions will still be made; however, the criteria will
be inconsistent and opaque, driven in large part by the
individual decision makers’ intuitions and preferences.
>In his article “Combining Decision Analysis and
Portfolio Management to Improve Project Selection in
the Exploration and Production Firm,”1 Michael Walls
demonstrates this in the context of energy exploration and
production (E&P). He applies modern portfolio concepts
to a set of available E&P opportunities. He identifies
an efficient frontier of possible portfolios (i.e., those
minimizing risk for a given return, subject to a constraint
on total investment funds) and plots risk (measured as
standard deviation of NPV) against return. In his example,
the firm’s existing portfolio is suboptimal, measured
in terms of either risk (i.e., there are efficient frontier
portfolios with the same return at lower risk) or return
(i.e., there are efficient frontier portfolios with higher
return at the same risk). So far, his approach is consistent
with “standard” modern portfolio theory.
Mr. Walls’ innovation is the notion that in order to select
one of the efficient frontier portfolios, the firm must be
able to answer the following questions:
- How much risk (standard deviation) are we willing to
tolerate?
- How much reward are we willing to give up for a given
reduction in risk, and vice versa?
- Are the risk-reward tradeoffs available along the
efficient frontier acceptable to us?
The first question requires an answer to the firm’s risk
tolerance. The answer will indicate the riskiest portfolio
choice that is tolerable. The second question requires
the firm to express its risk preferences. The answer will
allow the firm to select among available returns for given
risk levels.
Once the first two answers are known, the third question
can be answered. Mr. Walls shows how, by using a
corporate utility function, “decision makers can
incorporate their firm’s financial risk propensity into
their choices among alternative portfolios.” Of particular
importance is the idea that modern portfolio theory
presents a set of choices among possible portfolios. Which
of those portfolios to choose is still a firm-specific decision,
requiring explicit expression of firm risk preferences.
Element 5b: Cost of capital allocated
Capital allocation is among the most significant open
questions in actuarial science. While a thorough treatment
is well beyond the scope of this article, there appears to
be general agreement that what is really allocated is the
cost of risk capital as opposed to capital itself. This is in
contrast to the capital allocations that occur in
manufacturers. Those allocations involve actual cash
transfers of retained earnings and the investment of
that capital in the operation of the business – in salaries,
materials, power, marketing, etc. Risk capital allocations,
on the other hand, are completely theoretical. When an
insurer writes an automobile policy, no risk capital is
transferred to that policy.
Perhaps by an unfortunate turn of history, the same
manufacturing capital language was used to describe
risk capital. This reinforced the adoption of capital decision
analysis techniques based on manufacturing analogies,
such as internal rate of return.
Risk capital for financial intermediaries provides a
buffer that secures a certain counterparty status for the
firm in total. In this regard, risk capital is a measure
of the firm’s total risk-bearing capacity. Because of the
portfolio phenomena of diversification and accumulation,
however, this capacity is solely an aggregate measure,
only having meaning for the portfolio in total. In the
case of a generic firm, the “portfolio” is the accumulation
of risk exposures from all sources – operational, credit,
market, etc. Because the elements of portfolios may have
nonlinear interdependence, the impact of any one element
on the portfolio can also be nonlinear. This makes a linear,
proportional allocation of a total amount back to individual
elements quite complicated. There are many possible
ways this problem can be solved, each having its own
compromises and limitations.
Many researchers continue to allocate risk capital but use it
as an interim step in assigning the cost of that risk capital
to portfolio elements. The cost is the product of a riskadjusted
capital amount and a hurdle rate. Since the capital
is risk adjusted, this goes by the acronym RORAC (Return on
Risk-Adjusted Capital).
Others have tried to address this by taking a fundamentally
different tack. They define risk capital for a financial
intermediary as the amount needed to guarantee the
performance of that intermediary’s contractual obligations
at the default-free level. Under this framework, the notion
of return on risk capital has no meaning, since they have
bypassed the two-step RORAC process and leapt straight
to a cost. In extending this approach to insurance, we’ve
spurred a fundamental innovation – the recognition and
treatment of the entire pool of risk capital as a shared asset
or common pool resource.
Given cost of risk capital, with no allocated capital amount,
a good candidate decision variable is economic value added
(EVA®)2. The formula for EVA is:
EVA = NPV Return – Cost of Capital
EVA is typically expressed as an amount. An activity with
a positive EVA is said to “add value,” while one with a
negative EVA “destroys value.”
Element 5c: Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for mitigation
Once the corporate risk tolerance and capital cost
allocation are completed, the CBA is straightforward.
For example, under the EVA approach, any mitigation
effort resulting in a positive incremental EVA is worth
doing. Under capital allocation, any mitigation project
where benefit (reduced capital cost) exceeds costs should
be undertaken.
Risk management in an organization with multiple
business units and risk sources involves analysis of a
complex, multidimensional space. Effective decision
making in that space will be challenging, based solely on
a single risk metric. Statistical theory would recommend
a suite of decision metrics that are (as much as possible)
distinct and independent, reflecting different dimensions
of the space, and responsive to different dynamics.
However, corporate realities often mandate that a
compromise be struck in the interest of parsimony.
Corporations must make decisions, and effective decision
making often simplifies complex situations as much as
possible, but no more so.
1 Journal of Petroleum Science and Energy 44 (2004) pp. 55-56
Donald F. Mango is a managing director in the Instrat® unit at Guy Carpenter.
He focuses on analysis and advice for clients and has extensive experience in
and knowledge of enterprise risk management. Mr. Mango can be reached at .
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