By John Borneman and Richard Harris
There is no shortage of advice for compensation committees
of publicly traded companies. The Conference Board, the
National Association of Corporate Directors, the Business
Roundtable, and many others are weighing in on the role of
compensation committees, particularly when it comes to
establishing executive pay programs to achieve a desired level
of performance. The nature of the advice, however, has been
more in the way of “guiding principles” than implementation
instructions.
How should companies align executive pay with performance?
Until recently, share price appreciation was the definitive guide
for the “right” performance, which explains the heavy reliance
on stock options. But times have changed: options are falling
out of favor in part because stakeholders perceive that executives
are benefiting from market performance rather than
underlying corporate performance.
While there is no silver bullet for selecting measures and performance
targets, a comprehensive and rigorous approach can
create a rational and defensible link between pay and performance.
This article describes the tools and processes that
compensation committees can use to answer the following
questions:
- How should we define performance?
- What targets are appropriately difficult?
- How do we calibrate pay to performance?
A Healthy Pay-for-Performance Discussion
There are a number of analytical tools that can provide directors
with information to help evaluate various metrics and
performance levels and strengthen the link between executive
pay (cash and equity) and corporate performance. These tools
do not replace management’s input or directors’ judgment;
rather, they help increase understanding and create greater
insight. We believe that the best approach is a collaborative
one among the committee, the committee’s independent
adviser, senior management, and the company’s human
resource and finance functions.
Healthy debate over the issues identified by analytical tools
provides the basis for:
- compensation committees to meet the test of reasonableness
and the demands of effective governance, and
- senior management to motivate and direct the company’s
workforce.
Identifying the Right Performance Measures
The primary objective of most incentive plans is to drive performance
so that over the long term the value of the entity to
shareholders will increase. Selecting the right performance
measures is one of the most important aspects of establishing
the appropriate link between pay and performance. But determining
what is “good” performance and selecting where an
organization should focus its attention is not always so obvious.
There are two broad categories of measures – internal and
external. Internal measures, such as financial results or operational
objectives, are different from stock price or total
shareholder return (TSR), which are external. Stock performance
has long been favored, but for many organizations it
alone is rarely the best judge of an executive’s contribution to
performance. Stock price is influenced by market factors outside of management’s control and does not reflect day-to-day
decision making. So, what role should equity and stock price
have in executive compensation programs?
Performance Sensitivity AnalysisSM (PSA) can help committees
answer this question. Each company faces a unique risk environment
in the capital markets. PSA analyzes the source of
volatility in a given company’s stock compared to a peer group
of companies with similar industry or business profiles. This
analysis gives directors new insights into how firm-specific
behavior contributes to TSR as compared to industry and general
market factors. Thus, PSA provides a quantitative basis for
setting the degree to which equity performance – and the
related risk – should be part of incentive compensation design.
Exhibit 1 shows the risk profiles of a group of industry peers
and the market-, industry-, and firm-specific factors influencing
TSR volatility. Compared to its peers, Company 1 has low
TSR volatility, and most of it was the result of external – industry
and market – risks. This information played a significant
role in the company’s decision to reduce its emphasis on equity
compensation and to add relative performance metrics to
its long-term incentive plan.

After a company has addressed the role and importance of
equity and share price, the next decision requires an assessment
of how to measure success from an internal perspective
and to ensure that performance measures are aligned with
creating shareholder value.
Shareholder Value Analysis provides a basis for understanding
how financial performance on selected internal key metrics
relates to shareholder value creation. There is a wealth of historical
data available on the performance of US companies
and the market, often at a level granular enough to identify
the key drivers of shareholder value. Through regression analysis,
it is possible to identify how performance on a given
measure, or on multiple measures, links to shareholder value
creation over the short, medium, and long term.
Exhibit 2 shows why one company decided to incorporate
return on invested capital (ROIC) in its executive incentive
plan. In analyzing historical data, the company found a very
high correlation of ROIC to shareholder value in its peer
group.

Of course, identifying appropriate performance measures goes
beyond strong correlations and financial analysis of potential
outcomes. Each company has a different business strategy, its
own point on the maturity curve, and a unique culture. These
factors, as well as common sense considerations about the
measures – accuracy, reliability, simplicity, consistency across
plans, and transparency – should influence the final selection
of measures. But initiating the discussion with factual information
about which measures drive shareholder value is often a
valuable approach.
Setting Targets
Setting appropriate performance targets to link performance
measures to pay can be a difficult task, especially when new
programs are expected to address multiple years.
Management budgets and long-range forecasts are useful
starting points for the discussion, but, given the difficulty of
forecasting, they should not be relied upon as the only inputs
into the target setting process. The key questions include:
- Are the performance targets meaningful (is there sufficient
stretch)?
- Are they reasonably achievable (what is the probability of
earning a payout)?
As with measure selection, a number of analytical tools can
help evaluate the difficulty of performance targets.
Relative Performance comparisons are often an important
component of performance target setting. Although not necessarily
a predictor of the future, the company’s historical
performance compared to its peers and the broader market
can help directors assess whether targets are achievable and
meaningful. Targets are often set within a range of historical
peer performance, for example, at the 50th or 60th percentile
for target payouts, and 70th to 80th percentile for upside performance. Other companies use these historical comparisons
to set payout guidelines for achieving target levels of performance,
for instance, for three out of five years.
Beyond peer comparisons, External Expectations Analysis can
be used to determine if the selected performance goals are
sufficient to meet expectations built into the company’s current
market value. Stock analysts’ reports are an important
external source for these insights.
Their research often focuses on specific industry metrics and
expectations that they consider indicative of success and provides
some input into the target-setting process. Performance
targets can easily be derived that are directly comparable to
analysts’ projections of earnings per share (EPS) or cash flow.
Beyond analysts’ reports, the performance improvement
expectations built into stock price can be directly analyzed.
The value of current performance can usually be quantified
with reasonable assumptions. Looking at the gap between the
current value of operations and market value, future growth
expectations can be identified and should be considered in
evaluating targets.
Finally, a Comprehensive Financial Picture looks at the interrelationships
between measures and underlying performance
drivers. The board should first consider the broader financial
implications of performance against a specific metric and then
test the implications for one or more underlying measures
before signing off on the incentive plan’s performance goals.
For instance, in Exhibit 3, EPS goals are translated into revenue
growth and the net margin performance required to achieve
the goals. This evaluation helps a compensation committee
determine whether the overall performance required to
achieve a range of EPS outcomes is reasonable.

Calibrating Pay to Performance
The final requirement in aligning pay with performance is putting
the pieces together and making sure that “how much” is
reasonable given the measures and performance targets.
Neither boards nor shareholders like surprises. From a governance
standpoint, boards have an obligation to understand
how the incentive plan will operate at both anticipated and
unanticipated performance levels. This is particularly the case
if plan payouts are not capped.
Scenario Testing provides a basis for committees to understand
the implications of actual payouts relative to performance.
Payout levels against results should always be evaluated under
a variety of potential performance scenarios. This testing often
leads to discussions about the payout curve. A straight-line
payout between threshold, target, and maximum is common
but may not be appropriate in all cases. The question is: does
performance that is halfway between threshold and target
goals warrant half the payout? The answer is at the heart of
the calibration discussion. In some cases, the answer is “yes,”
and the straight line is appropriate. In others, it is a decided
“no,” and the payout curve between threshold and target
may look like a hockey stick with minimal payouts until performance
nears target.
Cost-Benefit Analysis helps to quantify the relationship
between aggregate payouts and the underlying value delivered
to shareholders. Two common approaches are to
measure incentive plan payouts (1) as a percent of net income
or other returns, and (2) as a percent of incremental performance
improvement (for example, year-over-year net income
growth). Regardless of approach, it is incumbent upon a committee
to understand whether the costs of the program and
the selected performance goals are commensurate with the
results for shareholders.
A note of caution: accurately benchmarking the cost-benefit
analysis relative to other companies is very difficult, as there
are significant differences between companies – even those in
the same industry – in terms of organizational structure,
staffing levels, pay mix, and incentive participation. Therefore,
evaluating the cost-benefit is often a test of “reasonableness”
rather than an exercise in explicit benchmarking.
A Word about Transparency
Transparency is one of the guiding principles for improving
governance of executive compensation. This implies simplicity
in design as well as comprehensive disclosure. Simplicity in
design is a laudable goal but very challenging where the
incentive plan is supporting complex business structures and
strategies. A good test for whether a design is simple enough
is if it can be communicated effectively – both internally and
externally.
Boards should communicate openly with shareholders,
investors, and employees when a plan is put in place and
when payouts occur. The proxy statement provides the opportunity
to discuss how the plan will operate, what the measures
are (proprietary details need not be disclosed), and the potential
range of payouts. After payout, the proxy statement
should include a follow-up disclosure about the results and
the payouts, and the company should consider a press release
to provide context for the payouts. In fact, given the new
Securities and Exchange Commission rules regarding compensatory
arrangements, prompt disclosure of awards for named
executive officers will be required. (For more information on
the new SEC disclosure requirements, go to
www.mercerHR.com/perspective and select the August 4,
2004 Special Issue Perspective.)
Summary
Performance measurement need not become so complicated
that it cannot be addressed effectively in the boardroom. But
delivering a relatively simple plan design with pay and performance
appropriately aligned requires rigorous factual
analysis supported by appropriate tools and healthy debate.
Ultimately, this approach both enables a committee to meet
governance standards and equips senior management to use
performance measures as a more effective management tool.
Mr. Borneman and Mr. Harris are senior executive compensation
consultants with Mercer Human Resource Consulting. They can be
reached at
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